The CJEU has no jurisdiction to rule in purely internal situations, save for three exceptions. As easy as this may sound, the CJEU's case law is not entirely consistent and created uncertainty for national courts. This article critically examines how the CJEU has dealt with purely internal situations. It shows that the CJEU should be stricter in defending its gates. Instead of turning the three exceptions into the rule, the CJEU should treat the three exceptions as they were originally envisaged: Exceptions. The recent Grand Chamber in Ullens de Schooten is a step in the right direction. A stricter approach makes it necessary that the CJEU looks a bit more over the national judge's shoulder, which changes the cooperative dynamic by putting the CJEU into a more vertical position vis-à-vis national courts. National courts can, however, escape this more conflictual setup by providing more detailed information as to the fulfillment of one of the three exceptions.
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and relevance of their questions. 19 The CJEU is "in principle bound to give a ruling" on questions about the interpretation of EU law because they enjoy "a presumption of relevance." 20 Note that this dichotomy between interpretation and application has been criticized on the grounds that one cannot only interpret the law in abstract without any regard to the facts. 21 It is therefore not surprising that the CJEU has in practice not stuck closely to this dichotomy and has in some judgments discussed the direction of application, without explicitly admitting so. 22 This separation of functions could be put in a broader perspective as well, focused more on the nature of the relationship between the CJEU and national courts. There are conflicting views on this theme. On the one hand, there are those who argue that this relationship is based, primarily, on cooperation. This is also how the CJEU seems to portray the preliminary reference procedure in its judgments. It has held numerous times that "Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts." 23 Scholars who take a "constitutional pluralist" perspective primarily accentuate dynamics of cooperation and construe the relationship as horizontal and heterarchical. This "theory" posits, among others, that national constitutions are the supreme source of EU law, that there is no hierarchical relationship, and that both national courts, as well as the CJEU, each claim final authority. 24 The theory primarily emphasizes the fact that the CJEU depends entirely on the national courts for their willingness to submit questions forcing the CJEU to be "humble and thankful" for the referring courts' engagement with it. 25 National courts are thus essentially the gatekeepers of the procedure. 26 The fact that many constitutional courts 1 3 6 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 have been reluctant to turn to the CJEU for help fits well within this model. 27 The CILFIT exceptions to the obligation of the highest courts to refer under Article 267(3) TFEU can also be interpreted as widening the autonomy of national courts. 28 Likewise, the use of open norms, such as proportionality, or "silent" judgments in which the CJEU avoids giving a full answer also confer discretion on national courts and supports a vision of cooperating courts. 29 In addition, the CJEU does not possess a coercive monitoring mechanism guaranteeing compliance with its ruling leaving the final say to the referring court. 30 On the other hand, there are those who approach the relationship primarily from the perspective of a hierarchy and opine that Article 267 is not a purely non-committal vehicle. 31 They point to the binding force of the judgments of the CJEU. 32 The CJEU's judgment in Köbler illustrates the hierarchical dimensions. In this judgment, the CJEU determined that Member States are also liable for infringements of EU law by national courts of the last instance. 33 The CJEU made clear that the Austrian court was not entitled to withdraw its request for a preliminary ruling because the CILFIT requirements had not been fulfilled. 34 With Köbler, the CJEU placed itself at the top of the judicial hierarchy. This could also be deduced from its definition of "sufficiently serious breach" including a "manifest breach of the case law of the Court in the matter." 35 The CJEU reaffirmed Köbler more recently in Ferreira da Silva and suggested that the refusal of the Portuguese court to refer could constitute a breach of Article 267 TFEU and give rise to liability. . 28 See Sarmiento, supra note 21, at 313. 29 See Gareth Davies, Activism Relocated. The Self-Restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL 'Y 76 (2012) . 30 See Sarmiento, supra note 21, at 309. 31 . 36 The CJEU held that "in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings," the Portuguese court was obligated to refer. The Portuguese court was wrong to consider the answer to be clair because of the conflicting decisions of lower courts regarding the interpretation of the concept of a "transfer of a business" and the fact that
See generally
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This short overview shows that there are contrasting claims. It is not the purpose of this Article to discuss the merits of the conflicting viewpoint, although it seems reasonable to conclude that both cooperative, as well as hierarchical elements, exist together in the case law of the CJEU. 37 De la Mare and Donnelly also argued that the CJEU has continued with its cooperation discourse with the idea of "sweetening the bitter pill of the CJEU's own repositioning" in Köbler. 38 The overview also raises the question how these two different approaches relate to the issue of the purely internal situation. A lenient approach on the side of the CJEU where it easily applies one of the three exceptions and/or whereby it simply relies on, and does not question, the assessment of the national courts fits best with the cooperational model presenting national courts as gatekeepers. By contrast, a more restrictive approach where the CJEU more critically examines the request of national courts turns the dialogue into a hierarchical relation, because the CJEU is "second guessing" and thus judging the preparatory work of national courts. It also means that the CJEU is "looking over the shoulder of the national judge." 39 This more detailed and careful assessment on the part of the CJEU requires it to grapple with questions about national laws and examine the factual situation. 40 When the CJEU pursues the latter approach and declines all too easily questions by national courts potentially upsets the spirit of cooperation and decrease the trust of national courts and their willingness to engage with the CJEU. 41 It is a rather delicate task for the CJEU to find a right balance between these considerations. Finding a right and clear balance is extremely relevant, as sketched already in the introduction. First, the preliminary ruling procedure only works effectively if the "rules of the game" are unequivocal and understood by the CJEU and national courts. 42 As will be 1 3 6 6 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06
further substantiated below, the current uncertainty with respect to the jurisdiction of the CJEU in relation to purely internal situations is especially problematic for national courts. Second, balance is also warranted from the perspective of the workload of the CJEU. Several authors note that the system of the reference procedure is under pressure and a "victim of its own success" because of the exponential increase in cases, especially since the mid2000s. 43 So far, the CJEU managed to cope with the growing caseload and even reduced the average duration of the procedure, but according to some to the detriment of the quality of argumentation in CJEU judgments. 44 It is expected that the CJEU is confronted with more referred cases because of the enlarged automatic jurisdiction of the CJEU after December 1, 2014 in the field of police and judicial cooperation, including areas such as migration and criminal law. The delay caused by a preliminary ruling is also a factor influencing the national courts' willingness to refer. 45 A too lenient approach of the CJEU in accepting cases, leading to more cases and a bigger delay, could further deter courts from referring questions when a preliminary ruling would be especially warranted.
C. Jurisdiction and Admissibility: What's in the Name?
When the CJEU is confronted with a purely internal situation which lacks any connection with the free movement provisions, the CJEU generally declines to answer the question. The rationale is that because the Treaty provisions do not apply in such situations, an answer from the CJEU is not relevant to solve the dispute. 46 In these cases, the CJEU employs several approaches to refrain from answering. The CJEU can declare that it does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 47 It can declare the questions inadmissible. 48 It can also simply hold that it is not necessary to answer the question or that EU law is inapplicable.
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These different routes and the concepts of (non)jurisdiction and (in)admissibility are used interchangeably by the CJEU even though they are different. 50 Jurisdiction is governed by the principle of conferral and acts as a limit to the CJEU's competence. 51 Based on Article 267 of the TFEU, the CJEU has the authority to give answers to questions about EU law which are posed by a national "court or tribunal of a Member State" in an area of law over which it has competence. This means that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Treaties, the validity and interpretation of national law or international law. Only when the CJEU has jurisdiction can it analyze the admissibility of the questions. Admissibility relates to the question as to whether the order for reference fulfills the procedural requirements or admissibility criteria and includes the sufficiency of information provided by referring court. Inadmissibility can subsequently be corrected by the referring national court in a new request for a preliminary ruling which repairs the previous "error of procedure." 52 Alternatively, the CJEU can request the national court to provide clarification based on Article 101 of the Rules of Procedure. These two options are not possible when the CJEU lacks jurisdiction.
53
It seems more logical that the CJEU deals with possibly purely internal situations in the context of the (in)admissibility of the questions rather than in relation to its jurisdiction.
54
This is because the forthcoming analysis illustrates that the CJEU has in principle accepted jurisdiction to deal with purely internal situations in three different types of cases. Only when it is beyond doubt that the exceptions are not applicable and that the situation is not governed by EU law, would it seem logical for the CJEU to declare that it has no jurisdiction.
55
Examining the presence of a sufficient cross-border element as an admissibility issue would also imply that this assessment is conducted at an early stage as a procedural matter instead of in the context of the substantive consideration of the questions. The CJEU did so in 50 Berlington where the CJEU accepted jurisdiction after determining that several customers to the Hungarian amusement arcades were EU citizens holidaying in Hungary and that it was far from inconceivable that operators from other Member States would be interested in opening a casino. 56 In other cases, such as Trijber, the CJEU nonetheless examined the connection with EU law and the cross border elements at a later stage in the context of the substantive consideration of the questions.
57
The rest of the article will not expand on the (conceptual) difference between the notions of jurisdiction and admissibility, but focuses more on the way in which the CJEU has applied those notions to the purely internal situation doctrine.
D. The Oosthoek Exception: Cross-border Effects Cannot be Excluded
I. The Recent Oosthoek Case Law of the CJEU
One exception to the general rule that the CJEU has no jurisdiction to hear purely internal situations are cases in which a cross-border effect cannot be excluded. In its case law starting from Oosthoek, the CJEU has answered questions in such situations on the basis that it is not unthinkable that nationals of other Member States may, in similar situations, be faced with the contested national measures adopted by the Member State. 58 The classical judgment in this respect is the free movement of goods case of Smanor which dealt with a French company selling deep-frozen yogurt on the French market that contested the French consumer protection law which restricted the use of "yogurt" to fresh yogurt only. The facts in this case were thus confined to one single Member State. The CJEU replied to the question of the French court and examined the French law without excluding the possibility that such products may be imported from other Member States. The CJEU did note that its ruling should not be applied in relation to Smanor in the national court proceedings. 59 In addition to the free movement of goods, 60 the CJEU has issued comparable judgments in relation to the other free movement provisions, capital, 61 services, 62 and establishment. 63 The rest of this section focuses on the recent free movement case law of the CJEU, except for citizenship cases. 64 Competition law cases will also be left aside.
65
In Attanasio Group, the Third Chamber of the CJEU 66 used-the now-often used expression-"it is far from inconceivable" that nationals from other Member States have been or are interested in establishing themselves, for the first time. 67 In this case, an Italian company was denied a permit to construct a service station selling fuel, because another company was granted a permit a short distance from the site envisaged by Attanasio. The The CJEU adopted a broad definition by determining "it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States." An actual impact on trade is not required, but the disputed practice must only be capable of having such an effect. Nor 67 The CJEU seems to have taken this "far from inconceivable" logic from procurement cases where this has been used by the CJEU in relation to the tendering of public service concessions. Centro Europa 7, for example, referred to two judgments in the field of public procurement for support. refusal stemmed from Italian regulations providing for mandatory minimum distances between such stations. 68 In a subsequent case, Blanco Pérez, the Grand Chamber also subscribed to this logic. 69 That case was about two Spanish pharmacists challenging Spanish rules which limited the opening of new pharmacies in Asturias even though they had not made use of the Treaty freedoms. The CJEU held that it cannot exclude foreigners who also want to run a pharmacy in Asturias. The eagerness of the CJEU to examine the Spanish measure also seems to stem from the fact that the measure was indirectly discriminatory because the selection process for new pharmacies favored pharmacists who had pursued their professional activities in the region of Asturias. 70 This judgment illustrates that the CJEU tends to focus on the nature and substance of the national measure which is "capable of producing effects which are not confined to that Member State" rather than the facts of the case. 71 In other words, while the factual elements are restricted to one individual Member State, the relevant legal elements are not. 72 The judgment also exemplifies that the CJEU seems eager to answer requests with the idea to "seize the moment," because it remains uncertain whether another court will refer a similar case, which has cross-border elements, in the future.
73
The "far from inconceivable" phrase has since been repeated in other cases in a mantra-like way, sometimes in a slightly different wording (e.g. "it is by no means inconceivable that" 74 or "it is conceivable"). 75 One example includes Libert, which dealt with Flemish legislation that made the transfer of immovable property in certain communes dependent upon a sufficient connection between the potential buyer and the communes. The CJEU again simply stipulated that it is by no means inconceivable that natural or legal persons in other 68 The CJEU eventually held that the rules are more advantageous to operators already established in Italy and, hence, discourage or even preclude access to operators from other Member States. See Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano, Case C-384/08 at para. 24. 69 Blanco Pérez, Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 at para. 40. 
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Member States were or are interested. 76 In Venturini, three Italian owners of parapharmacies requested an authorization to sell medicinal products and proprietary drugs for veterinary use for which a prescription is required but the cost of which is wholly borne by the customer. Their request was rejected based on Italian law and because those products could only be sold in pharmacies. Venturini itself accepted that there was no actual crossborder element, but the CJEU noted that the legislation potentially had restrictive effects on the possibility for operators based in other Member States to become established in Italy because "it is far from inconceivable" that nationals in other Member States had or have an interest in operating pharmacies. 77 In addition, in Trijber, the CJEU held that one cannot speak of purely internal situations when there is a probability that services may be enjoyed by nationals of other Member States and service providers from other Member States may wish to establish themselves in the Netherlands. 78 Despite the fact that in this case both the service provider and the recipients were Dutch, this situation-without much discussion and against the Opinion of AG Szpunar-fell within the scope of the freedom of establishment and the Services Directive.
79
There are several recent cases in which the CJEU applied a stricter approach and did not answer the referred questions. 80 Those cases illustrate that the CJEU, contrary to the previous judgments, clearly expects national courts to substantiate their findings that economic operators in other Member States were affected or interested in pursuing an economic activity. 81 In Ragn-Sells, the CJEU was confronted with a company that contested G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 the awarding of a service concession for the collection and transport of waste produced in the Estonian Municipality of Sillamäe. In this case the CJEU held that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU do not apply to this situation, because there was nothing in the case file suggesting that undertakings in other Member States were interested in treating waste in Sillamäe. 82 While the CJEU did not require an actual interest in the previous cases and found a mere probability sufficient, the CJEU was more strict in Ragn-Sells. 83 In Sbarigia, the CJEU declared the request inadmissible, because the questions were not relevant for the outcome of the dispute. This case involved an owner of a pharmacy located in the touristy historical center of Rome which had applied for an exemption from the obligatory holiday closure period because of the considerable increase in the number of consumers in this period. 84 The CJEU considered it unclear how a decision on exempting a pharmacy from the opening hours might affect economic operators in other Member States. 85 In addition, what also seemed to matter in Sbarigia, and what makes this case different from the previous ones, is that the applicant did not call into question the general system of rules on opening times and holidays for pharmacies, but only tried to obtain an exemption from that system. 86 Two other cases worthy of closer inspection are Airport Shuttle Service and Crono Service. Airport Shuttle Express concerned a dispute about the suspension of the authorization to operate a car and driver-for-hire service because the operator used garages in the territory of another municipality. This ran counter to the Italian law which provided that it is compulsory to exclusively use a garage situated in the territory of the municipality which issued the authorization for the service in question and that the service must begin and end at that garage. The CJEU held that it does not have jurisdiction, because it was not clear how this law affects economic operators from other Member States. 87 This Italian law was also contested in Crono Service. The CJEU again held in similar terms that it cannot be presumed that the law has any cross-border impact. It subsequently pointed out that the national court The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling 1373 had failed in its orders for reference to establish any cross-border interest and did not explain why the Italian rules could hinder foreign operators. 88 The CJEU subsequently declared that it did not have jurisdiction to answer the questions. 89 In both Airport Shuttle Service and Crono Service, the CJEU used an additional notion in order to determine whether an answer is useful, which echoes the third exception relating to the prohibition of reversed discrimination-see section F. The CJEU held that a question is useful "if its national law were to require it to allow a national to enjoy the same rights as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EU law in the same situation." In these two cases, the CJEU denied such usefulness by only referring to foreign companies "in the same situation as the applicants," i.e. companies that are "already . . . pursuing an economic activity on a stable and continuous basis from an establishment located in Italy." By applying this fiction, the CJEU was able to conclude that foreign companies are not affected, also because there was nothing to indicate how economic operators from other Member States might be affected. 90 These judgments are thus indicative of a stricter approach of the CJEU, because it could also be argued, in the same way as in the cases previously discussed, that it is not far from inconceivable that nationals of other Member States might be affected by the Italian law, which is capable of producing effects beyond Italy, especially in the border region. 91 In pursuing the latter route, the CJEU would also take the contested national measure as the departure point as it has done in the cases discussed earlier. The approach of the CJEU in the two stricter Italian cases, which has not been applied afterwards by the CJEU, primarily takes the factual situation as the starting point.
In other cases, the CJEU has left the question of its jurisdiction and/or the admissibility of the questions in the middle. In its Grand Chamber judgment in Rina, the CJEU examined an Italian law requiring the registered offices of companies classified as certification bodies to be situated within the territory of the Italian Republic. It did so without paying any attention to the question of admissibility or jurisdiction of the questions, even though Attorney General (AG) Cruz Villalón held that there is "a somewhat hypothetical element," because 90 The CJEU held that the applicants were already authorized to operate a car and driver hire service, but their authorizations were temporarily suspended because they did not meet several conditions. They merely aimed to strike out some conditions and were thus not challenging the general system of rules governing car and driver hire or the way in which authorizations are granted. See ECJ, Joined Cases C-162/12 and C-163/12, Airport Shuttle Express, ECLI:EU:C:2014:74, para. 39, Judgment of 13 Feb. 2014. 1 3 7 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 the three companies challenging the measure were at that time only providing certification services in Italy. 92 The Commission expressed the same view during the hearing. 93 Similarly, in Ottica New Line a company contested the authorization of a request of a competitor to establish an optician's shop in a Sicilian town because it was in breach of an Italian law's limits relating to population density and on the distance between opticians' shops. Even though AG Jääskinen held that the facts of this case were confined to one Member State only, even a single region, without any cross-border elements, the CJEU paid no attention whatsoever to the admissibility/jurisdiction question and immediately went to the merits of the case.
94
II. A Critical View on Oosthoek: Unclear Criteria and a Too Welcoming CJEU
The rather welcoming approach of the CJEU in (some of) the Oosthoek-cases has been criticized on various grounds. First of all, at a more fundamental level, the CJEU has been criticized for using Article 267 TFEU as a "back-door mechanism" to enlarge its own jurisdiction and to extend the benefits of EU law to all EU citizens, including Member States' own nationals. 95 The "far from inconceivable" logic that a national measure can have potential consequences which are not restricted to a single Member State, is inherent in the internal market. The criterion of "far from inconceivable" seems particularly easy to fulfill in relation to services because a cross-border element could always be identified from the perspective of both service suppliers as well as service recipients. 96 Hence, almost all national measures that affect businesses can potentially be brought within the scope of EU law because it is nearly impossible to completely exclude the possibility that national laws lack cross-border effects. 97 The CJEU's easy identification of a cross-border element in Trijber, relying on the mere possibility that service recipients are non-nationals, means that there will almost always be a cross-border element.
98 By applying EU law to all EU citizens, including Member States' own nationals in purely internal situations, the CJEU can be 92 95 See Ritter, supra note 59, at 5; Grimbergen, supra note 50, at 58. 96 See Caro de Soussa, supra note 1, at 177; Ritter, supra note 59, at 4. 97 See Grimbergen, supra note 50, at 58. 98 See also Case C-98/14, Berlington, ECLI:EU:C:2015:386, para. 23-28, Judgment of 11 June 2015.
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The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling 1375 criticized for interfering with the Member States' autonomy and competencies going beyond the competencies assigned to it and the EU. 99 This interference is especially remarkable given that the CJEU has never really explained the rationale behind its case law on purely internal situations and the "far from inconceivable" logic. 100 It seems that the approach of the CJEU can primarily be explained by the wish to counter the effects of the reverse discrimination stemming from the four fundamental freedoms.
101 This is because of the seemingly perverse outcome that national measures are contrary to EU law when they are applied in cross-border situations, but are perfectly legal in purely internal situations.
102
Nationals or products of a Member State are disadvantaged because a national rule applies to them, while the same rule does not apply to nationals/products from other Member States because that violates EU law. This outcome seems to have been the main driver of the CJEU-for a further discussion of reverse discrimination, see Section F. The CJEU has not really addressed the more principled question of how to balance state autonomy and alleviate such reverse discrimination.
103
As said before, the purely internal situation functions as a "gatekeeper" to the preliminary ruling procedure from a procedural point. A refusal on the part of the CJEU to answer questions, as in Airport Shuttle Express and Crono Service, does not say anything about the legality of the national measure from a substantive point of view. It simply means that the measure should be challenged by a different person whose case includes a cross-border element or alternatively by the Commission in the context of an infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU. 104 In enabling natural or legal persons to challenge national measures in purely internal situations, the CJEU essentially broadens indirect access to the CJEU. In doing so, the CJEU basically acknowledges the possibility of "my brother's keeper," situations where nationals challenge restrictive national measures on behalf of persons in 99 See Ritter, supra note 59, at 3, 12; Opinion of Advocate General Darmon at paras. 10-11, Joined Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi v. Belgian (July 3, 1990), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/. 100 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06
other Member States. 105 The problem with this lenient approach is that it could lead to never-ending litigation by individuals and legal persons challenging many rules and regulations that obstruct their businesses in their drive towards unlimited deregulation and a "market without rules."
106 This risk has become more pertinent recently, because of the broad and unclear criterion of "far from inconceivable." It is not difficult to argue that it is fulfilled, as the Dutch CJEU Judge Prechal also noted recently. 107 Nonetheless, at the same time, it should be acknowledged that an overly strict approach on the part of the CJEU might also be undesirable. If national courts or the parties must prove that there is not only a potential interest, but that persons from other Member States are actually interested in offering a certain service, this could give rise to problems with respect to delivering sufficient proof. In addition, if the CJEU were to require that breaches of fundamental freedoms be contested by persons who have already made use, or are trying to use, such freedoms, this would prevent the CJEU from examining national measures which considerably hamper access to that respective market. 108 In this context, one could argue that it is undesirable to declare a question inadmissible for being purely internal if there is a reasonable chance that the same issue will occur in a case with cross-border elements. The case at hand, which is purely internal, shows that the issue as such is not merely hypothetical and that economic operators are affected. In terms of efficiency and legal certainty, it then seems justifiable to anticipate cross-border situations, instead of waiting until they actually occur.
Leaving aside what the correct approach is, the current problem is the seeming inconsistency in CJEU case law. Sousa observed in this context that the CJEU is using the purely internal situation doctrine strategically as a way to decide which cases it wants to handle itself and which should be left to national courts. 109 The more liberal approach of the CJEU in Blanco Pérez and Trijber can be contrasted with the CJEU's reluctance to answer in Sbarigia and Ragn-Sells. It is therefore unsurprising that in Venturini the opposing parties were both able to bolster their arguments with reference to the case law of the CJEU. While Venturini and
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the Commission referred to Blanco Pérez, the defendant based its arguments on Sbarigia. The inconsistent approach is especially problematic for national courts confronted with purely internal situations. 110 The Dutch Council of State, for example, pointed to the seemingly stricter approach of the CJEU in Ragn-Sells in its referral in Trijber. 111 It is unclear how national courts should explain the way in which foreign market operators might be affected. What is the required level of potentiality or inconceivability? Is it necessary to prove that companies in other Member States have actually expressed their interest? How many foreign clients are needed? What is the threshold?
112 Even Judge Prechal noted that the jurisprudence of the CJEU lacks clarity in this respect. 113 It is particularly the criterion of "far from inconceivable" that is not sufficiently distinct and which has therefore led to criticisms that the CJEU uses purely internal situation arbitrarily in determining which cases it wants to rule on.
114
The uncertainty could also affect the uniform application of EU law. On the one hand, some national courts, following the strict approach of the CJEU, rightly or wrongly, refrain from putting questions to the CJEU because they think that the CJEU cannot help them in such purely internal situations. On the other hand, other courts might be tempted to forward questions all too eagerly in the hope of benefitting from the accommodating approach of the CJEU. In the first scenario, this could mean that national measures conflicting with EU law remain unchallenged, because courts wait for a case with a factual constellation involving cross-border elements. Such incompliant national measures are more easily remedied by courts following the second scenario.
In conclusion, the CJEU should offer more guidance and be more explicit about the exact factors to be considered so that national courts stop wasting time and resources on requests 1 3 7 8 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 which will never be answered. 115 At the same time, it is not only the CJEU who should be blamed for its relaxed approach. National courts also have an important responsibility for ensuring that their request for a preliminary ruling also includes a detailed and clear overview of the factual and national legal context of the case to enable the CJEU to determine whether there is a sufficient cross-border element. 116 This also means that the CJEU itself will be spared unnecessary references which solely relate to internal situations.
E. The Dzodzi Exception: National Law Makes a Renvoi to EU Law in Situations Outside the Scope of EU Law
I. The Recent Dzodzi Line of Cases
The CJEU has also accepted jurisdiction and/or declared questions admissible when EU provisions are made applicable by national law in situations outside the scope of EU law with a renvoi. In such situations, national law voluntarily adopts the same approach as EU law, something which has been referred to as "spontaneous harmonization." 117 The CJEU has not only been willing to consider renvois in national legislation but has even answered questions in relation to references in private law provisions in contracts. 118 While Thomasdünger was the first judgment in which the CJEU pursued this line, it was in Dzodzi that the CJEU extensively set the contours of this second exception. 119 In the latter case, Belgian law referred to EC law and stipulated that in some case third-country partners of Belgians 115 One fruitful starting point for the CJEU might be Belgacom, a public procurement case, where the CJEU offered more yardsticks in determining whether there is a certain cross-border interest even though there were no economic operators who had actually manifested their interest. The CJEU held that such an interest might be derived from the financial value of the planned agreement, from the location where it is to be performed or its technical characteristics. 116 This responsibility of national courts also avoids the misuse of the preliminary ruling procedure. This responsibility also stems from the duty of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU. See Prechal, supra note 12; Galetta, supra note 43. 117 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 57, at para. 43; Kaleda, supra note 59, at 2. 119 In Thomasdünger, the German court asked for an interpretation of the Common Customs Tariff in a situation outside the scope of the Tariff but where the Tariff was made applicable by German rules. Without paying much attention to this scope question, the CJEU merely held that "except in exceptional cases in which it is clear that the provision of Community law . . . does not apply to the facts of the dispute . . . the Court leaves it to the national court to determine . . . whether a preliminary ruling is necessary." See Case C-166/84, Thomasdünger v. Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main, 1985 E.C.R. 3001, para. 11.
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The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling 1379 needed to be treated as if they were EU nationals in order to avoid reverse discrimination. AG Darmon held that the question should be declared inadmissible because there was no link with EC law. 120 The CJEU disagreed because it held that it is not for the CJEU to examine the relevance of questions posed by national courts. The CJEU thus declared that it has jurisdiction because "it is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given a uniform interpretation irrespective of the circumstances in which it is applied." This line of cases is, however, not entirely consistent. In some cases, the CJEU examines more vigorously the renvoi to EU law. In Kleinwort Benson, the CJEU determined that the reference to EU law must be "direct and unconditional" and that the application of EU law needs to be "absolutely and unconditionally" binding on a national court. The CJEU did not consider it sufficient that the national court is obliged to merely take account of the CJEU's case law. 123 Nonetheless, in subsequent cases such as Leur-Bloem, the CJEU reaffirmed the "Dzodzi principle" and dropped the more restrictive Kleinwort Benson approach. 124 In this case, Dutch provisions made EU law indirectly applicable by using a language similar to the Taxation of Mergers Directive, but not word for word. Even though no explicit reference to EU law was made, the intention of the Dutch legislature was that the Dutch law would be interpreted in the same way as the Directive. 125 Instead of applying the direct and unconditional renvoi test of Kleinwort Benson, the CJEU coupled the Dzodzi logic of "forestalling future differences" with the notion of "same solutions" approach. It declared that it is in the EU's interest for the CJEU to answer questions "where, in regulating purely internal situations, domestic legislation adopts the same solutions as those adopted in Community law." 126 In other cases, the CJEU also noted in very general terms that the national provision refers to EU law while not paying much attention to Kleinwort Benson criteria. 127 In other cases, the CJEU also accepted indirect and implicit references to EU 120 law. 128 In BIAO, the CJEU considered questions admissible even though German provisions did not reproduce the EU law verbatim, but the CJEU especially attached weight to the factor that its interpretation would be binding on the referring court. 129 The latter finding was, however, disputed by AG Jacobs. 130 In Kofisa Italia, a 1972 Italian decree on VAT referred to customs legislation. The Italian court asked the CJEU about the Community Customs Code, but this Code did not exist when the decree came into existence in 1972. 131 In addition, both the Italian government and the Commission noted that they are unsure whether the national dispute would be solved by applying EU rules. 132 The CJEU, nonetheless, held that there was nothing in the file suggesting that the referring court could depart from the CJEU's interpretation of the Customs Code. 133 This latter notion that there is nothing in the case file indicating otherwise has since then be repeated in other cases as well.
134
In several recent cases, the CJEU has also used the "same solutions" idea from Leur-Bloem in a mantra-like way. The CJEU has simply stated that it should answer questions in cases where, in regulating purely internal situations, domestic legislation seeks to adopt the same solutions as those in EU law, such as the avoidance of discrimination against its own nationals (see section F), any distortion of competition and the provision for a single procedure in comparable situations as such solutions. 135 The CJEU easily accepted to answer questions in Unamar and Quenon about agency contracts for the sale of banking services and insurance falling outside the scope of a directive on self-employed commercial agents negotiating the sale or the purchase of only goods. It simply noted that the Belgian legislature had decided to apply the same treatment to agency contracts for goods and those relating to services. 136 This rather easy reliance on the intention of the legislature is also
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138
As with the first exception, the CJEU's approach has not been entirely consistent. The CJEU sometimes employed a stricter approach enforcing the Kleinwort Benson criteria based on the order for reference or from the file submitted to the Court. 139 In Nolan, the CJEU held that it is necessary to verify on the basis of "sufficiently precise indications" whether the renvoi is made in a direct and unconditional way. 140 The CJEU concluded that this was not the case because the respective Directive was not "automatically applicable" in situations as in the case at hand. 141 In Agafiţei, the CJEU declared the reference inadmissible, especially because it was unclear whether the Romanian legislature intended to adopt the "same solutions." 142 In Parva Investitsionna Banka, the referring court sought an interpretation of Regulation No. 1896/2006, which created a European order for payment procedure to fill a lacuna in the Bulgarian legislation. The CJEU, based on a relatively detailed analysis, felt that very general references to international treaties and general principles of Bulgarian law are not enough in the light of the Kleinwort Benson requirements. 143 Likewise, in other cases the CJEU declared questions inadmissible because it was not clear that it was necessary for the 137 referring court to rely on an interpretation of EU law to establish the meaning of the applicable national rules. 144 Another good example is Cicala, where the CJEU explicitly restated the Kleinwort Benson restrictions by noting that the reference to EU law's applicability was not made in a direct and unconditional way in the national law. The CJEU held that the renvoi was tied too generally to unspecified principles without identifying specific rules of EU law with respect to the duty to state reasons, such as Article 296 TFEU or Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter.
145
Neither did the referring court explain whether the renvoi also sets aside the Italian rules dealing with the obligation to state reasons. This also meant that the latter provisions "are applicable without limitation" to the case at hand, as a result of which the renvoi is not unconditional either. There is consequently no "definite interest" of the EU in guaranteeing uniformity of interpretation of those EU law provisions. 146 The CJEU hence declined jurisdiction. In two subsequent cases, Romeo and De Bellis, the CJEU also held that it has no jurisdiction and reiterated this view in questions about the same Italian legal provision, noting that the referring court failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. 147 The referring court did not, for example, show that the objective of the (general) renvoi is to guarantee that internal situations and situations falling within the scope of EU law are treated identically.
148
II. A Critical View on Dzodzi: A Partial Application of the Stricter Kleinwort Benson Criteria
The Dzodzi line of cases has been fervently criticized in academic literature and has met fierce resistance from Advocate Generals in the 1990s and early 2000s. 149 Despite these fundamental objections and heavy AG criticism, the CJEU has not really reconsidered its Dzodzi judgment as the preceding analysis shows as well. 150 An illustration of this is that the
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Dzodzi and Leur-Bloem logic is cited almost three times as much as Kleinwort Benson.
151
What's more, the analysis above shows that there is still not much consistency between both lines of cases. 152 It is therefore somewhat surprising that the criticism in the literature and among AGs seems to have evaporated in recent years.
153 AG Kokott even "defended" the Dzodzi line of cases in the competition case of ETI by arguing that the rationale behind the CJEU uniformly interpreting EU law in purely internal situations is ensuring legal certainty by creating comparable competition conditions for all operators. 154 Others, including AG Wahl, also noted that the text of Article 267 TFEU does not preclude the CJEU from ruling on renvoi cases, because it merely provides that a question of interpretation of EU rules must be "raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State" when "it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment." Several AGs also argue, in line with the CJEU approach discussed in section B, that the generous approach of the CJEU coincides with the spirit of cooperation between the CJEU and national courts. 155 Even though the Dzodzi line of cases is no longer heavily criticized, it remains worthwhile to repeat some of the earlier comments and critically discuss the case law in the light of this. Instead of suggesting that the CJEU should do away with its approach, the main aim of the following overview is to explain that there is a need for the CJEU to employ a more consistent and stricter approach in line with Kleinwort Benson.
One point of criticism relates to the fact that the CJEU bases its jurisdiction on national law instead of EU law proper. 156 The CJEU extends the scope of EU law through unilateral and 1 3 8 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 independent references in national laws. 157 It could also be argued that by promoting the application of EU law beyond its original scope, the CJEU is assuming powers not assigned to it by the Treaties, creating a tension with the principle of attributed competences.
158
Given this points of criticism, AG Darmon referred to the Dzodzi line of cases as an "illdefined cooperation" falling "outside the confined and precise aims of the preliminary ruling mechanism," while Rasmussen spoke about an "erroneous interpretation" of Article 267 TFEU.
159
There are also some more practical problems that could result from the reliance on national law for the CJEU's jurisdiction in such purely internal situations. One consequence could be that there is considerable divergence across Member States as to the jurisdiction that the CJEU enjoys and hence the protection that individuals can derive from EU law, albeit indirectly. 160 In Member States where there are many renvois this jurisdiction and protection could be more extensive. In addition, the reliance on national law could create an imbalance in the sense that the Commission cannot start infringement proceedings in relation to Member State's (in)actions following CJEU's rulings in the Dzodzi type of situations. This is because those purely internal situations formally fall outside of the scope of EU law so that it might be difficult to speak of a Member State's failure to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties in the sense of Article 258 TFEU. 161 The third point of criticism is that in the Dzodzi line of cases the CJEU is interpreting EU law "irrespective of the circumstances in which it is applied" as the CJEU itself has consistently asserted. 162 This means in essence that the CJEU is interpreting EU law outside its proper context thereby risking to neglect all important factors or being deceived by irrelevant aspects related to the particular set-up of the respective national legal system. 163 AG Jacobs illustrated this problem with reference to Leur-Bloem dealing with a purely domestic transaction involving a restructuring of the ownership of companies which appears to have hardly any connection with the transactions envisaged in the Tax Directive on cross-border
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The CJEU and References for a Preliminary Ruling 1385 mergers to which the Dutch provisions made a renvoi. The domestic restructuring might also be carried out for reasons primarily related to the Dutch system which are completely different from those foreseen in this Directive relating to removing tax obstacles for crossborder groupings and avoiding tax avoidance. 164 Given this different context, there is hardly a "focus for debate" for the CJEU which can only be remedied by drawing from "fictitious situations." 165 The latter is not free from problems. AG Jacobs pointed to the CJEU's own case law in which the CJEU underlines the importance of taking account of a different context when interpreting provisions in different documents. 166 Because of such potential different contexts, it is not evident that the CJEU's interpretation in renvoi cases will also be relevant and useful for the national court to solve the dispute in the main proceedings. 167 The Dzodzi line of cases can be criticized for the CJEU's heavy dependence on the whims of the national judiciary. The reluctance on the part of the CJEU to examine the Kleinwort Benson conditions stems from an idea that given the earlier discussed division of functions between the national courts and the CJEU it is only for national courts to examine the exact scope of the national reference to EU law, see section B. 168 This deferential approach is also visible in the often repeated notion that:
Consideration of the limits which the national legislature may have placed on the application of Community law to purely internal situations, to which it is applicable only through the operation of the national legislation, is a matter of domestic law and hence falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State. 169 The generous approach could be particularly problematic in renvoi cases when it is unclear whether the referring court is also legally bound by the CJEU's interpretation of EU law. 1 3 8 6 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06
When the CJEU does not take up this issue, it is essentially performing tasks it refused to do for good reasons, namely by giving answers that are "purely advisory and without binding effects." 171 It seems logical that the CJEU closely scrutinizes the national court's obligations in relation to the CJEU's interpretation. 172 It should be welcomed that the CJEU did so in Allianz. In this case, the CJEU was confronted with the Hungarian competition law which used "identical concepts" as Article 101 TFEU, even though no explicit references were made to EU law in the text of the Hungarian legislation. The Explanatory Memorandum, however, justified the legislative proposal on the basis of requirements of EU law. 173 The CJEU accepted jurisdiction and attached value to the fact that the order for reference showed that the Hungarian Supreme Court is bound by the CJEU's interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.
174
But even when the national court is obliged on paper to apply the interpretation of the CJEU in a purely internal situation, this still does not completely preclude national courts from disregarding the CJEU interpretation because they might argue that the context of the CJEU's interpretation is different or that the situation falls outside the scope of EU law. 175 The obligation for national courts to apply EU law provisions and the CJEU's interpretation thereof can also be changed by the legislature or court judgments when that requirement stems from case law. 176 It is unclear what legal consequences ensue when courts depart from the requested CJEU interpretation in renvoi situations. As stated above, it is unlikely that the Commission can start infringement proceedings, nor does state liability on the basis of Köbler seem to offer a suitable form of redress. 177 One related issue which has not been solved yet by the CJEU is the question as to whether there is also an obligation on the part of the highest national courts to refer in renvoi cases. This does not seem to be the case. There is no obligation to apply EU law because EU law only applies on the basis of national law. 178 There is likely significant uncertainty on the part of the highest courts about this, especially in the light of the recent case law of the CJEU and ECtHR with respect to their duties to refer. 179 In light of these four lines of criticism, the CJEU should more strictly apply the two-pronged test of Kleinwort Benson. 180 The community should welcome the CJEU's increasing willingness to examine the renvoi. 181 As outlined in section B, this is not an easy task for the CJEU. When the CJEU has to examine the question of whether its interpretation in renvoi situations is binding for the referring court, the CJEU must grapple with questions about national laws because the CJEU essentially has to judge the work of the national court. 182 The CJEU should also avoid doing "guesswork" and conducting this analysis on the basis of its own specialist knowledge because this could mean that not all Member States are treated equally. 183 So it is safest for the CJEU to rely on the national court. This, however, means that the CJEU only knows that the EU is applicable because the referring national court tells it so. 184 As with the first Oosthoek exception, the stricter approach on the part of the CJEU should be coupled with increased efforts on the part of national courts to show that the Kleinwort Benson criteria are fulfilled and that they are obliged to follow the requested interpretation of the CJEU. It is the responsibility of national courts to offer enough information so that it is clear for the CJEU that an answer is "objectively required." 185 This is easier said than done. There is currently a perverse encouragement in the sense that 1 3 8 8 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06
national courts wishing to shield their own Member State's legislation from scrutiny can easily circumvent the CJEU's by not including anything in the order for reference. With such a "bad" reference, a national court could thus fulfil its obligation to refer, but still prevent scrutiny by the CJEU.
A stricter CJEU approach might eventually result in a lower number of requests being answered, at least in the short term before national courts become accustomed to the stricter approach of the CJEU. This raises the question as to how problematic it is from the perspective of EU law when the CJEU declines to answer more questions for failing to specify the factual and especially legal context or for not satisfying the Kleinwort Benson criteria. The rationale of the Dzodzi line of cases is primarily "forestalling future differences" in order to guarantee the uniformity of EU law. The CJEU has, however, never really specified these risks for the uniformity. 186 AG Jacobs noted that the risks for the uniformity of EU law are only indirect and temporary and that such "remote threats" can easily be challenged when an erroneous interpretation is also applied in a situation governed by EU law. 187 It could even be argued that by easily accepting renvoi cases, the CJEU is increasing its own case docket and thereby delaying the length of proceedings of "genuine" references which might discourage national courts from sending requests and thereby paradoxically affecting the uniformity of EU law. 188 On a more pragmatic note, the CJEU could decrease its workload and save its own resources, something which still seems desirable in the light of the record number of references.
189
In summary, national courts should carefully show in their request for a preliminary ruling why they consider the Kleinwort Benson criteria to be fulfilled in renvoi cases. The CJEU should assess more intensely than it has done before whether those criteria are fulfilled. 186 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at para. 36. 187 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra note 8, at para. 49; AG Darmon also noted that the unity of the EU legal order is not affected by purely internal situations. See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 99, at paras. 8-9. 188 See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, supra note 132, at para. 41. 1 3 9 0 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 06 the CJEU, for example, simply referred to the statements of the representative of the applicant who stated that provisions in the Finnish administrative law ensure that Finnish nationals do not suffer reverse discrimination. 197 In Duomo GPA, the CJEU suggested that the national court should merely explain that the lawfulness of the national legislation depends on the CJEU's interpretation. 198 The Guimont principle has also been used in conjunction with the Oosthoek line of cases about potential cross-border effects. The CJEU used it as an additional reason for its conclusion that it should have jurisdiction and/or that the questions are admissible, after having considered that other nationals might be interested in offering their services. 199 In Centro Europa 7, the CJEU left it to the national court to determine the cross-border interest after having determined that undertakings in other Member States have been or would be interested, but held that it is "in any event" necessary to answer the question, because such a reply might be useful if Italian law prohibits reverse discrimination. 200 The CJEU has frequently used the following double negative to accept questions: "Since it is not obvious that the interpretation of European Union law would not be of use in enabling the referring court to proceed to a determination of the case" (emphasis added). 201 Just as with the Oosthoek line of cases, the CJEU has recently adopted a more restrictive approach in some cases, even though the CJEU has not pursued this approach consistently in all cases as illustrated by Duomo GPA, Susisalo, and Garkalns. Nonetheless, there is clearly a trend towards more intensely examining requests for a preliminary ruling on the basis of the information provided by the national court in the order for reference. 202 In Omalet, the CJEU declined to answer questions in purely internal situations, because the referring court made clear that Article 49 EC (currently Article 56 TFEU) does not apply to purely internal situations and a rule against reverse discrimination does not exist in the national legal
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order. 203 In Ordine degli Ingegneri di Verona, the CJEU also based itself on the order for reference and held that national law, as confirmed by constitutional case law, outlaws reverse discrimination. 204 Likewise, in other cases, the CJEU declared questions inadmissible because the order did not provide any indications that national law prohibits reverse discrimination. 205 In Paola C., the CJEU even held in rather explicit terms that "it is not for the Court to take such an initiative if it is not apparent from the order for reference that the national court is actually under such an obligation." 206 
II. A Critical View on Guimont: CJEU is Answering Hypothetical Questions
The criticism expressed earlier in relation to Dzodzi is even more warranted in relation to the Guimont principle because the CJEU is answering a question that might eventually not be raised "just in case." 207 Ritter aptly described the approach of the CJEU in the following terms: "Dear national court, your question is actually not necessary to rule on the underlying case, but just in case your national law prohibits reverse discrimination (and we won't bother checking whether that's actually the case here), we will give you a reply." 208 Such a "theoretical" CJEU judgment conflicts with another strand in the case law of the CJEU whereby the CJEU refused answering hypothetical questions. 209 The Guimont case law is thus essentially a partial return to pre-Foglia liberal case law in which the CJEU exercised more deference towards the national courts' questions. 210 In line with the discussion of the criticism in relation to the Dzodzi line of cases, the stricter approach of the CJEU in the recent cases discussed at the end of the previous subsection, reflecting the earlier discussed Kleinwort Benson criteria, is to be welcomed. 211 The stricter
